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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
Plaintiffs; Lane Swainston, Lori Swainston and Lane
Swainston as guardian ad litem for Zachary Swainston, a minor.
Defendants: Intermountain Health Care, Inc., dba Utah
Valley Hospital, Steven S. MacArthur, M.D., Steven S. MacArthur,
M.D., a professional corporation, and DOES I through X,
inclusive.

Of the defendants, only Intermountain Health Care,

Inc. is a party to this appeal.
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case in federal court under federal law.

The district court

certified its order as final and directed entry of the order
pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

(R. 336-41, Add. 1-6.)

IHC filed

both a final-order appeal and an interlocutory appeal, and the
interlocutory appeal was granted. (R. 364, 606.)

The appeals

are now consolidated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 25, 1984, the Howard firm, through attorney
Richard B. Johnson, entered its appearance of counsel for the
plaintiffs in this case.

(R. 39.)

At that same time, the case

of Wilson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., Civil No. 69908
(filed June 14, 1985), was also pending in the Fourth District
Court of Utah County.

IHC was represented in Wilson by

out-of-state counsel, Peter C. Rosenbloom.
Affidavit, R. 111.)

(I Tr. 7; Rosenbloom

On July 11, 1985, Mr. Rosenbloom telephoned

Richard B. Johnson to associate the Howard firm as local defense
counsel for IHC in the Wilson case.

Rosenbloom explained the

nature of the Wilson case and identified each of the
defendants, including IHC.

Johnson agreed to associate the

Howard firm as local defense counsel for IHC in the Wilson
case.

Johnson did not disclose to Rosenbloom that he and the

Howard firm were at that time representing the plaintiffs
against IHC in this case, as well as representing other
plaintiffs against IHC in several other cases.
44-54, 64; Rosenbloom Affidavit, R. 111-12.)

(I Tr. 8-22,

Johnson did not

disclose the conflict of interest to either the plaintiffs in
this case or IHC and failed to obtain the consent of either the
-2-

plaintiffs or IHC to engage in the conflicting representation.
(I Tr. 61-63, 81, 99-101; II Tr. 5-11, 20, 27, 45-46; Gilson
Affidavit, R. 108-09.)
The Howard firm, through attorney Johnson, subsequently
acted as local defense counsel for IHC in the Wilson case and
was identified as such in documents filed in the Wilson case.
(I Tr. 12; R. 113-14, 116, 134-35, 152.)
Howard firm's services.

IHC was billed for the

(I Tr. 60-61; R. 115.) During their

representation of IHC in the Wilson case, Johnson and the
Howard firm acquired or had access to privileged or confidential
information that may have been used or construed against the
interest of IHC in this case and other cases against IHC.

(II

Tr. 21-24; Gilson Affidavit, R. 109; Answers to Interrogatories,
R. 246-47.)

The Howard firm withdrew from representing IHC in

the Wilson case on January 16, 1986, but only after IHC
discovered the conflicting representation and demanded its
withdrawal.

(II Tr. 5-11; I Tr. 60-63.)

IHC subsequently filed motions to disqualify the Howard
firm from representing the plaintiffs in the several cases that
firm had pending against IHC during the dual representation.
The first case in which the motion to disqualify was ruled upon
was the federal court case of Bodily v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986), an action for
wrongful deprivation of medical staff privileges.

In that case,

U.S. District Judge J. Thomas Greene found that the Howard firm
had violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
but concluded that under federal law disqualification was not
-3-

required.

(Id.; Bodily Memorandum Decision also attached as

Exhibit "A" to state district court's Ruling, R. 342-63, Add.
7-28.)
In the interest of judicial economy, counsel for IHC and
the Howard firm stipulated that the transcript and record
relating to the disqualification motion in Bodily should be
incorporated into this case to be relied upon by the state
district court in ruling on the motion to disqualify under Utah
law.

However, instead of addressing the merits of the motion

to disqualify, the district court merely incorporated the ruling
of Judge Greene in Bodily, and held that adjudication of the
motion to disqualify was barred by the collateral estoppel and
full faith and credit doctrines.

(Ruling, R. 336-41, Add. 1-6.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Underlying this appeal are serious violations of the Utah
Code of Professional Responsibility that require
disqualification of plaintiffs1 counsel under this Court's
statement of Utah law in Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195
(Utah 1985).

Collateral estoppel does not apply to bar

adjudication of the disqualification motion because the issue on
which preclusion is sought (1) is not identical to the issue
decided in Bodily, and (2) was not decided in a final judgment
on the merits.

Adjudication of the motion is not barred by the

full faith and credit doctrine because the Bodily order would
not be given preclusive effect under federal law.

-4-

ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
The Howard firm's violations of the Utah Code of

Professional responsibility are at least as serious and damaging
as those found to require disqualification in Margulies v.
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985).

For a period of over six

months the Howard firm was acting as defense counsel for IHC in
the Wilson case while simultaneously suing IHC in this case
and several other cases throughout the state.

The Howard firm

engaged in this conflicting representation without the knowledge
or consent of any of the parties involved.

In addressing the

disqualification motion in Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986), the federal court found
a clear violation of the conflict-of-interest proscription
embodied in Canon 5.

Id at 475-76.

In responding to the

disqualification motion in this case, the Howard firm admitted
that its conduct violated Canon 5.

(R. 307.)

Under this Court's analysis in Margulies, the Howard
firm's conduct violated not only Canon 5, but Canon 9 as well,
and mandates the sanction of disqualification.

Speaking of

Canon 5, this Court stated:
At the very least, one has to wonder about the trust and
confidence a [client] will be able to repose in an
attorney whose partners and associates are suing him for
professional malpractice. . . . Jones, Waldo's failure to
comply with the standards set forth in Canon 5 may not
be cured or rectified by an optional withdrawal in the
case of its choice . . . .
[696 P.2d at 1203-04.]
An actual violation of the conflict-of-interest proscription
involving clients on both sides of several different cases
-5-

throughout the state certainly gives an unmistakable "appearance
of professional impropriety" in violation of Canon 9:
The basis of this tenet is that society's perception of
the integrity of our legal system may be as important as
the reality, since it is the perception that engenders
public confidence that justice will be dispensed.
Litigants are highly unlikely to be able to maintain this
confidence if their attorney in one matter is allowed
simultaneously to sue them in another. [Id. at 1204.]
This Court concluded in Margulies that where a serious
appearance of impropriety is coupled with another violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the integrity of the
court system and of the profession "requires" disqualification.
Id. at 1205.
Thus, the underlying disqualification motion is a matter
of substantial importance, not only to the parties of this case,
but to the legal profession and the entire justice system.

The

district court plainly erred in refusing to address the merits
of the motion.
II.

IHC IS NOT COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED TO OBTAIN A DECISION ON
THE MERITS OF THE DISQUALIFICATION MOTION IN THIS CASE.
The district court denied the motion to disqualify

primarily on the basis that IHC "is collaterally estopped to
relitigate the same issue that was decided by Judge Greene in
the case of Bodily v. IHC."

(Add. 4.)

However, a thorough

analysis of the purpose and elements of collateral estoppel
demonstrates that it has no application to this case.
The purpose of collateral estoppel is to prevent
relitigation of issues which a party has previously litigated,
and thereby promote judicial economy.
-6-

Penrod v. Nu Creation

Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983).

This Court has

developed four tests or elements to determine the applicability
of collateral estoppel:
1.

Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in
question?

2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3.

Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a
party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?

4.

Was the issue in the first case competently, fully,
and fairly litigated?

Baxter v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 705 P.2d 1167, 1168
(Utah 1985).

All four elements must be satisfied for collateral

estoppel to apply.

Id.

In this case, only the third element

is satisfied, as IHC was a party to the Bodily case.

If the

fourth element is regarded as merely a due process protection,
see Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah App. 1987), then
it too was satisfied in Bodily.

However, if it is viewed as

an adjunct to the first element, see Schaer v. State, 657
P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah

1983), then it was not satisfied, as the

following analysis demonstrates.
A.

Lack of Identity of Issues
To satisfy the first element of collateral estoppel, the

issue sought to be precluded must be "identical to," i.e.,
"precisely the same as" the issue adjudicated in the prior
action.

Wilde v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419

(Utah 1981).

The precise issue adjudicated in Bodily was

whether the Howard firm's conflicting concurrent representation
-7-

required disqualification under federal law.

While lawyers

practicing in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah
are governed by both the state and national codes of
professional responsibility, "the Utah Supreme Court's
construction of Utah's version of the Code is [only] relevant
and persuasive," not binding.
at 473 n.6.

Bodily, supra, 649 F. Supp.

A motion to disqualify counsel filed in federal

court ultimately "must be resolved by resort to federal law,"
McMahon v. Seitzinger Bros. Leasing, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 618,
619 (D. Pa. 1981), rather than to rules of state courts,
International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271,
279 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1978).
Accordingly, while the Bodily court cited Margulies
in its analysis of the Howard firm's ethical violations, it is
apparent that the Bodily court relied principally on federal
case law, and in deciding whether to impose the sanction of
disqualification relied entirely on federal law.

Had Judge

Greene followed Utah law as set forth in Margulies he would
have ordered disqualification.

Instead he relied on federal

cases that require "a restrained approach" and impose
disqualification only upon a showing of actual prejudice and
tainted proceedings.

Bodily, supra, at 477-78.

By

contrast, Margulies held that violations of Canons 5 and 9
"may not be cured or rectified by an optional withdrawal in the
case of [counsel's] choice."

696 P.2d at 1204. Rather, because

"society's [including clients'] perception of the integrity of
our legal system may be as important as the reality," id.,
-8-

such violations "require" withdrawal from both actions,
without a showing of actual taint or prejudice.

_Id. at 1205.

Thus, it is apparent that Judge Greene decided the
disqualification motion in Bodily under federal law, as he was
expected and required to do.

The issue whether the Howard

firm's conflicting concurrent representation requires
disqualification under Utah law is raised for the first time
in this case and is yet to be adjudicated.

Because that issue

is not "identical" to the issue decided in Bodily, collateral
estoppel cannot apply.
The case of Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co.,
596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979), supports the conclusion that
litigation of a matter in federal court under federal law does
not bar subsequent adjudication of the same matter in state
court under state law.

There, a corporation obtained a loan,

pledging four automobiles as collateral.

The Internal Revenue

Service later seized the cars to satisfy the personal tax
liability of the corporation's organizer.

The corporation filed

suit in federal court to recover the automobiles and in state
court to enjoin foreclosure on the loan.

The federal court

ruled that the corporation was merely the organizer's alter ego
and upheld the seizure.

The lender in the state action then

invoked collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of the alter
ego issue.

However, this Court rejected application of

collateral estoppel because the federal ruling was based on
federal law and the lender's corporate-fiction defense in the
state action was based on Utah law.
-9-

Thus, while the objective

or desired result was the same in both actions, i.e., to pierce
the corporate veil, the issues were sufficiently distinct to
preclude application of collateral estoppel.
See also Beckmann v. Beckmann, 685 P.2d 1045, 1050
(Utah 1984) (bankruptcy court order discharging debts under
federal law did not preclude state court adjudication on which
debts were discharged under state law); Rhoades v. Wright, 622
P.2d 343, 349-50 (Utah 1980) (Colorado court's dismissal of
wrongful death action based on Colorado statute of limitations
did not bar adjudication of the limitations issue in Utah under
an identical Utah statute); Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center,
Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 558 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1977)
(federal court determination of mall's status as public utility
did not preclude adjudication of the issue by state PSC).
In sum, the first element of collateral estoppel is not
satisfied because the disqualification issue raised in this case
is not identical to the issue decided by the federal court in
Bodily.
B.

Absence of Final Judgment on the Merits
For collateral estoppel to apply, the precluded issue

must have been adjudicated in "a final judgment on the merits."
Baxter, supra, 705 P.2d at 1168. Collateral estoppel may
not be based on an interlocutory order.
Practice pp. 744-47 (2d ed. 1984).

IB Moore's Federal

Finality for purposes of

res judicata or collateral estoppel is measured by the same
standard as for appealability.

Gresham Park Community

Organization v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1242 (5th Cir. 1981).
-10-

In Utah, "a judgment, to be final, must dispose of the case as
to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of
the litigation on the merits of the case."

Kennedy v. New Era

Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). See also,
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)(same
rule under federal law). Absent "finality" or certification of
finality under Rule 54(b), the order "shall not terminate the
action . . . [and] is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of [final] judgment."
federal rule).

U.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (identical to the

However, even a trial court certification of

finality does not necessarily make an otherwise interlocutory
order "final." Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 768
(Utah 1984).
Clearly, the Bodily order denying disqualification did
not finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on
the merits.

The district court in this case characterized the

Bodily order as "final" under the collateral order doctrine.
(Add. 5.)

However, the court is in error because the United

States Supreme Court has expressly held that a federal court
order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is not a final
collateral order and "is not subject to appeal prior to
resolution of the merits."

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981).

See also

Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Roller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985)
(federal court order granting disqualification motion is not a
final collateral order).

The fact that Judge Greene regarded

his Bodily order as "final" does not make it so.

See

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1957).
Thus, the Bodily order is interlocutory in nature and remains
subject to revision until entry of final judgment. Therefore,
it may not serve as a basis for collateral estoppel on the
disqualification issue.
Finally, it should be noted that the purpose of
collateral estoppel will not be defeated by a ruling on the
merits of the disqualification motion in this case.

To conserve

the resources of the parties and the court, counsel stipulated
that the transcript and relevant portions of the Bodily record
could be incorporated into the record in this case.

Thus, a

decision on the merits of the disqualification motion in this
case will not result in duplication of the Bodily adjudication.
In sum, the necessary elements of collateral estoppel are
not present in this case; therefore, the district court erred in
applying collateral estoppel to deny the disqualification motion.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT BARRED BY THE FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT DOCTRINE FROM DECIDING THE DISQUALIFICATION MOTION.
The district court also ruled that it was barred by the

full faith and credit clause from deciding the disqualification
motion.

(Add. 4.)

However, the full faith and credit

provisions, U.S. Const., art. IV, §1 and 28 U.S.C. §1738, merely
require a court to accord a prior judgment the same preclusive
effect that it would have in the jurisdiction where it was
rendered.

E.g.. Braselton v. Clearfield State Bank, 606

F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1979); Veiser v. Armstrong, 688 P.2d 796
(Okla. 1984).
-12-

The federal court's order in Bodily would not be
accorded collateral estoppel effect under federal law. Under
federal law, the prerequisites for collateral estoppel are
substantially the same as those outlined above from Utah cases.
See IB Moore's Federal Practice U 0.441 (2d ed. 1984).
There can be no preclusive effect under federal law because, as
demonstrated above, the issues in the two cases are not the same
and the Bodily order is not "final." Accordingly, the
district court was not required to give full faith and credit to
the Bodily order:
There are many cases that have held that collateral
estoppel, as an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata,
deals with the conclusive force of final judgments and
therefore has no application until a final judgment is
entered. This view is almost certainly correct in the
context of full faith and credit, for as a general
principle a court is not required to afford to the
decision of another court more faith and credit than it
is afforded by the court that rendered it. It follows
that a decision that is interlocutory in the rendering
court cannot command obedience in another court. [IB
Moore's, supra, p. 745 footnotes omitted.]
The few cases that could be found dealing specifically
with a disqualification motion in the context of collateral
estoppel confirm that, under federal law, rulings on such
motions would not be given preclusive effect.

In Hawkins v.

Holiday Inns, Inc. , 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1163,311 (D. Tenn.
1980), aff'd without opin., 652 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1981) (Add.
29-31), the defendant moved to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel,
and the plaintiffs argued that the issue was precluded by
collateral estoppel because a motion by the same defendant to
disqualify the same counsel in a different case had previously
-13-

been denied.

The court rejected that argument, concluding that

it was not bound by the determination in the other federal
court.

The court reasoned that collateral estoppel has no

application to a motion to disqualify counsel because every
court has the inherent right and duty to regulate the conduct of
attorneys practicing before it.

In view of the clear ethical

violations, the court concluded that it "would be remiss in
failing to disqualify [counsel]" solely because a different
court in a different case did not consider disqualification
necessary.

The court added that if the challenged counsel

thought collateral estoppel applicable, they should have moved
to stay proceedings on the second motion instead of opting "to
take two bites at the apple."

See also Fisher Studio, Inc. v

Loew's, Inc., 232 F.2d 199, 204 (2nd Cir. 1956).
Similarly, in this case the district court erred in
concluding that it had no discretion to address the motion
simply because the Bodily court had denied a similar motion.
The district court has the duty to regulate the conduct of
counsel under Utah law and the discretion to order
disqualification where appropriate.

The full faith and credit

clause does not demand that Utah courts and Utah law be
subservient to federal courts and federal law.
v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343, 351 (Utah 1980).
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DISTRICT COURT

-F UTAH COUNTY,
I

S L-

LANE SWAINSTON,
Plaintiffs,

(

)

vs.

Ci vil No. 66045

(

INTERMOUNTA IN HE A I TH C.A R E,)

etal ,

RULING

J

D e f endiimi s .

*
,

Tl ii :: m a 1 1 e r co'oies b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , i incie i Ru 1 e
2.8,

on the motion of defendant, seeking an order dis-

qualifying plainti".

•* ] , Howard, I .ewi s & Peter se .i i,

from further representing plaintiffs i n this case.

The

Court has reviewed the fi 1 :••, considered the memoranda of
CM in;-.* 1

#jni P ft *

advisee m

c.ur. ;

PI ng

trie premises, now makes the following:
RULING
FINDINGS;
1

The parties have entered into the following

'stipulation:
"Defendant Intermountain Health Care, Inc , dba Utah
Valley Regional Medical Center
n

AHC")

- -

hereinafter referred to ar
I, I ,ew i s 8 Peter sei i by and

through their respective counsel, hereby stipulate as
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follows:
WHEREAS, IHC has filed a Motion to Disqualify with
this Court, alleging a conflict of interest on the part
of the law firm of Howard, Lewis & Petersen resulting from
Howard, Lewis & Petersen's representation of IHC in Vada
S. Wilson v. Intermountain Health Care, et al., Civil No.
69908, an action filed and currently pending in the fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah County; and
WHEREAS, a similar motion was filed in the case of
Norman Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care, et al., in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division; and
WHEREAS, an evidentiary hearing was held on September
29, 1986, before the Honorable J. Thomas Greene, on IHC's
Motion to Disqualify pending before that Court, and a
Memorandum Decision and Order was issued on November 25,
1986, finding a violation of Canon V but denying the Motion
to Disqualify; and
WHEREAS, both IHC and Howard, Lewis & Petersen desire
to resolve the current Motion to Disqualify before this
Court in a timely and expeditious manner without resorting
to a full evidentiary hearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IHC and Howard, Lewis & Petersen, by
and through their counsel of record, hereby request oral
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arguiin'iil

n

IIK " " M n l i

mi I

I> i

'M|IM1 I

t'Y ,

HTMI

. I ^ I *-T

nnd

stipulate as follows:
formal evidentiary hearing,
the

"« :

•

v. IHC before Judge Greene max
•|)e

re

i±e

Xli t|ie

.. -

±*: j*.

-.th the Court ? >ermission,

matter pending before this Court, a

copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibitft;
2.

That i f the "witnesses who testified before Judge
y M.-'T (••• c a l ] eci !:• ::: testi f) :li i 1 tl: :d s matter

Gre

tl: ley w ::: • i 1] ::i

testily ;K ^ manner consistent wi th their testimony i n the
Bodi I y DT ~>c>-ec ing;
3

•

mental Memorandum in support (1
r^n7r\-p-

i

followed

it

'

:*? M -ion r
r--:

disqualify,
•-)•- ' " i r \

: i'"

-^}.4-iemental Opposite ;. .w tn* Motion

Howard, Lewis & Petersen; and finally IHC's Supplemental
Repl ;;; ; and
A

That the parties hereby submi t to the Court as

Exhibit B hereto a copy of Judge Greene's Memorandum
Deci sI c i l ai Id c i : d€ i: I i I Bodily v , xntermountain Health Care,
et a l . "
2

Tl lat the said Memorandum Decision a:\d

entered by Judge Greene on. November 2 5, 19

-r.;er

^rtached

hereto as Exhibit: "A" amid To whiih reference is hereby
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made.
Based upon the foregoing the Court concludes
as follows:
1.

That the motion to disqualify should be denied

on the ground that defendant is collaterally estopped to
relitigate the same issue that was decided by Judge Greene
in the case of Bodily v. IHC, Case No. C85-373G, United
States District Court for the District of Utah.
This Court is of the opinion that it should give
full faith and credit to the Decision in Bodily since it
is apparent that Judge Greene based his Decision on Utah
law (particularly Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 p.2d 1195)
as well as Federal law.

That Judge Greene was fully

cognizant of Utah law is demonstrated by his noting that
the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility has been
adopted by the Federal Court of Utah (Rule l[g] of its
Local Rules of Practice) and the same was operative in
his Court.

It is also apparent that Judge Greene considered

the Margulies case distinguishable upon its facts and that
he exercised his discretion in determining that disqualification should not be imposed.
In analyzing the matter it is obvious that the
issue presented to this Court under the pending motion is
identical to the issue decided by Judge Greene in Bodily.

-!>-

It also seems apparent that there was a final
judgment o™ the merits

aodily

e

':•• -ir.v event it hab betjn held

Greene specificallv stages.

f

ana c» Llateral *
asserted I

K

rights

: nt- n«ai. action mav ^t .haract*

without waiting for t *. > whole case t
in bodily

;

and collateral *

%

1

decided
:

Clearly

separable from

4

:ie .ssuei. *•. medical malpractice and

pei'-una I in inn* y asserted by Bodily against IHC (see In re
Reporters Committee for Freedom of tl: le Press, et a] , 773
F.2d 1325'

- order is final for purposes of collateral

esliipi

vcrsfMl uin Appeal, modified, or set aside

in the court oi. renditioi i .

(Berry v. Berry,

Rep. 45)
It

I

>i

IIJII.IHH

,i{i{m 11.

III

I

IIHII

flh |.nl

.Jeainst

whom the plea of collateral estoppel is asserted in this
ease flUf ) was a prirM to the Bodily case in the Federal
District Court.
There can be no question hut that the issue of
cii.Mlu.jIil it -if inn in H< di ] y was completely, fully and fairly
litigated as tl>

lan/cripi

; .;._

. „^t-

:.*.

. bodily

and the decision * f Judge Greene clearly show.

that the doctrine • i

jl.ateral e:>t ppei . ., app.i.a: <e

s
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in this case.
2.

The Court, by reason of the foregoing, and

pursuant to Rule 54(b) URCP hereby directs that the Order
denying the Motion to Disqualify is a final Order and shall
be entered as such and that there is no just reason for
delay in the entry thereof as a final judgment.
Dated this

13 ~

day of August 1987.

BY THE COURT:

R

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

XfciERiC***

DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION
NORMAN W. BODILY,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

VS.

INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE
CORPORATION, dba McKAY-DEE
HOSPITAL CENTER, H. GARY PEHRSON
and SHELDON D. WARD, M.D.,

Civil No. C85-373G

Defendants.
This matter came on for hearing on September 29, 1986,
on defendant Intermountain Health Care Corporation's Motion to
Disqualify.

Defendant Intermountain Health Care was represented

by Dan S. Bushnell and Charles W. Dahlguist II, and the law firm
of Howard, Lewis & Peterson was represented by Glenn C. Hanni.
Legal memoranda were submitted on behalf of all parties,
testimony of witnesses was heard and exhibits were received into
evidence.

Counsel argued the Motion extensively after which the

matter was taken under advisement.

The court now being fully

advised, sets forth its Memorandum Decision and Order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The law firm of Howard, Lewis & Peterson (the "Howard
firm"), which is located in Provo, Utah, has a well-established
general litigation practice with particular emphasis upon medical
malpractice and personal injury claims.

On April 1, 1985, the

plaintiff, Norman W. Bodily, by and through his attorneys., the

Howard firm, filed a medical malpractice action in federal
district court against Intermountain Health Care Corporation
(f,IHCM).

At the time the dispute herein arose, the Howard firm

had six other lawsuits pending in various stages of discovery
against IHC in various courts within this state*
On July 11, 1985, Mr. Peter C. Rosenbloom of the Los
Angeles, California law firm of Findlay, Kumble, Wagner, Hein,
Underberg, Manley & Casey contacted Mr. Richard B. Johnson, a
partner with the Howard firm, by telephone.

Having selected the

Howard firm from among listings in the Martindale Hubbell
referral service, Mr. Rosenbloom briefly introduced himself and
indicated that his firm had been retained by IHC to represent
that entity in connection with a wrongful discharge action
brought by Veta S. Wilson.

Wilson, a former employee of the Utah

Valley Regional Medical Center, a Provo, Utah facility owned and
operated by IHC, had filed an action against IHC on June 14,
1985, in Utah's Fourth Judicial District Court.

In his

conversation with Johnson, Rosenbloom indicated that his law firm
needed a local firm to move for the admission of certain firm
members to practice in the Wilson matter and also to conform
documents to the local rules of practice.

Johnson testified that

during this initial telephone conversation he specifically
informed Rosenbloom that the Howard firm had a number of
malpractice cases pending against IHC, including the Bodily
litigation.

Johnson said he explained that the Howard firm's

proposed representation of IHC presented a serious conflict of
interest problem but that Rosenbloom said he did not see a
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conflict, nor have any problem with the Howard firm's pending
lawsuits against IHC in unrelated litigation.

Nevertheless,

according to Johnson, Rosenbloom stated that if there were any
problems in discussing the matter with his superiors and the
client, he would let Johnson know.1

Otherwise, Rosenbloom said

that the file would be sent the next day with instructions for
Johnson to appear as local counsel in the case in order to
accomplish the purposes previously outlined.2
The following day, Johnson received a confirmation
letter from Rosenbloom by express mail dated July 11, 1985,
requesting that Johnson file a motion for the admission, pro hac
vice of Mr. Gary R. Overstreet, Mr. Michael W. Monk and Mr. Peter
C. Rosenbloom for purposes of the Wilson litigation.

The matter

was set up on the billing and accounting records of the Howard
firm under the name of Rosenbloom since Mr. Johnson considered
that he was simply performing a minor professional courtesy as
local counsel for out of state attorneys.

Johnson did not

1

A disputed telephone log was produced for the first time by Mr.
Johnson during the course of these proceedings. A notation
thereupon relative to the crucial initial conversation between
Johnson and Rosenbloom had the following entry: "Gary Overstreet
• meeting with client - IHC conflict explained 1) Pro Hac 2) file
motion to dismiss will send if client approves."
2 Rosenbloom testified that during this conversation Johnson made
no mention of the Howard firm's then existing adverse
representation of Bodily, or of the Howard firm's various prior
and pending lawsuits against IHC. He further testified that
nothing was said about a possible conflict of interest.

discuss the new representation with other members of the Howard
firm, and no one otherwise discovered the Howard firmfs
conflicting representation of IHC.
On July 17, 1985, Johnson filed the appropriate motion,
and an Order admitting the California attorneys was signed by
Honorable George E. Ballif on August 1, 1985.

Later in August,

Johnson reviewed and edited a draft of motion to dismiss and
memorandum in connection with the Wilson matter, and returned it
to Rosenbloom who made additional corrections and returned it to
Johnson.

The motion and memorandum were filed with the Utah

court on August 19, 1985.

Subsequently, Johnson prepared a

notice of deposition, which was to be held on September 27, 1985,
although Johnson was never contemplated as the attorney who would
take the scheduled deposition.

On October 17, 1985, Rosenbloom

sent Johnson a letter confirming a conversation several days
earlier and enclosed a draft of their proposed reply brief in the
frilson litigation.

Johnson also edited this brief as to form and

filed it with the court.

On November 8, 1985, the state district

court ruled upon an ex parte motion and order for leave to file
an oversized memorandum and order, which motion had been prepared
by Johnson.

Mr. Johnson did no further work on the Wilson matter

after this time and he submitted a bill to the California counsel
for legal services and costs in the name of Rosenbloom for the
amount of $195.82.
According to Johnson's testimony, supported by other
evidence,, no written documents of any kind were requested or
received by Johnson from IHC.

Johnson at no time discussed the

Wilson case with IHC's counsel, management or other personnel.
Johnson testified that the Howard firm did not receive from any
source, nor was it privy to, any confidential or secret
information of IHC*

Although Johnson did not solicit or receive

information of any kind in connection with the Wilson litigation
which may have been used or construed as against the interests of
IHC in other litigation, as counsel for IHC in the Wilson case he
had access to such information and materials.
Johnson testified that it was his understanding from
the representations of IHC's designated California counsel that
IHC had knowledge of the need for local counsel and was
consenting to the Howard firm's representation in this matter.
Nevertheless, Johnson did not memoralize his initial conversation
with Rosenbloom concerning the disputed disclosure of the
conflict by way of a follow-up letter to Rosenbloom or by other
written communication.

Johnson did not contact or inform IHC or

its Salt Lake City counsel of the Howard firm's potentially
conflicting representation.

Further, Johnson did not contact any

of the other clients of the Howard firm, including Bodily, which
had pending lawsuits against IHC for the purpose of disclosing
the potential conflict and obtaining their consent to the
proposed dual representation.

In November, IHC's inhouse and

Salt Lake City counsel discovered that the Howard firm had been
engaged by the California firm to represent IHC.

Johnson was

immediately contacted by telephone and told to perform no further
service and that his employment in the matter was terminated.

It

is undisputed that in this telephone conversation Johnson
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asserted that the California firm had "cleared" the
representation insofar as conflict of interest matters are
concerned.
The movant in this action cannot be said to have
brought this motion for purely tactical reasons, but there was
evidence of a poor professional working relationship between
counsel in the Bodily litigation.

This "bad blood" between the

attorneys may have been a partial motivation for the instant
motion.3

Mr. Johnson withdrew as counsel in the Wilson matter on

January 16f 1986.

On March 6, 1986, IHC filed the instant Motion

to Disqualify in the case before this court, alleging violations
of Utah's Code of Professional Responsibility by the Howard firm.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I.

THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
The law governing lawyers consists of principles of

substantive and procedural law as well as ethical rules.

Certain

requirements of lawyer conduct, such as mandates of competence,4
3

Charges of "unprofessionalism and a violation of the Canons of
Ethics" were not only denied but responded to with charges of
"generally bad" prior experience, resentment and an assertion of
"pomposity."
* Certain ethical mandates, such as lawyer competence, may
reflect substantive law requirements such as the standard of care
required of lawyers, but rules of ethics are said not to create
the substantive law requirement. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct y adopted by the ABA in 1983 and presently pending before
the Supreme Court of Utah with certain proposed modifications to
replace the existing Code of Professional Conduct, set forth the
scope and purport of ethical rules as the basis for disciplinary
action but not necessarily civil liability:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of
action nor should it create any presumption that a
legal duty has been breached. The Rules are designed
-*

may emanate both from substantive law and ethical rules.

Other

requirements of lawyer conduct, such as certification of
allegations in pleadings, may emanate from rules of court and
rules of procedure as well as ethical rules.

In some cases,

courts have established rules of law from ethical rules.5

in the

conduct of litigation, courts often apply rules of law and/or
rules of ethics to preserve the integrity of the proceeding.
There is no practical distinction in cases arising in many
jurisdictions, including the United States District Court fcr the
to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies* They are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability.
Model Rules, p. 5.
5 For instance, the canon of ethics which makes it improper for
an attorney to communicate directly with a person or. the other
side who is represented by counsel has been utilized to create a
rule of law which would exclude otherwise voluntary statements
obtained from an accused. In United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d
110 (10th Cir. 1973), the court was confronted with violation of
an ethical canon in which the prosecuting attorney had obtained a
statement from a criminal defendant without informing his
attorney or giving him a reasonable opportunity to be present at
the interview. The court observed that no constitutional
principle was here involved, but said:
What we do hold, however, is that once a criminal
defendant has either retained an attorney or had an
attorney appointed for him by the court, any statement
obtained by interviev; from such defendant may net be
offered in evidence for any purpose unless the
accused's attorney was notified of the interview which
produced the statement and was given a reasonable
opportunity to be present. To hold otherwise, we
think would be to overlook conduct which violated both
the letter and the spirit of the canons of ethics.
This is obviously not something which the defendant
alone can waive.
Id. at 112.
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1

District of Utah, where the court in question has incorporated as
a rule of court the Code of Professional Conduct or other ethical
rules.6
Violation of the law and rules governing the conduct cf
lawyers in the context of litigation requires, among other
things, an analysis of the nature of the violation and its impact
upon the trial proceedings.

The imposition of appropriate

sanctions is properly left to the discretion of the trial court.
II.

VIOLATIONS OF THE CANONS OF ETHICS
It is alleged that the Howard firm violated various

Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
firm raises three basic defenses:

The Howard

(1) that under the facts of

this case there is presented a situation of prior representation
which would bring into play the doctrine of "substantial

6

Rule 1(g) of the Civil Rules of Practice of the United States
District Court for the District of Utah states:
The standards of conduct of the members of the bar of
this court . . • in a particular case shall be those
prescribed by the Utah Code of Professional
Responsibility and amendments thereto and revisions
thereof and by the Code of Professional Responsibility
approved by the Judicial Conference of the United
States.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in E.E.O.C. v. Orson H. Gygi
Co., 749 F.2d 620, 621 n.1 (10th Cir. 1934), recognized that the
above quoted rule of practice incorporates both the state and
national codes of professional responsibility and makes both
binding upon counsel before this court. See also City Consumer
Services, Inc. v. Home, 571 F. Supp. 965, 969 (D. Utah 1983)
("Utah's Revised Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by
this court in Rule 1(g) of the Local Rules of Practice, [is]
binding on all members of the federal bar."); In re Roberts/ 46
B.R. 815 (D. Utah 1985). Of course, the Utah Supreme Court's
construction of Utah's version of the Code is relevant and
persuasive.
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relationship";7 (2) that adequate consent was obtained from IHC
through its designated agents or representatives so as to permit
simultaneous representation; and (3) that even assuming the
existence of a conflict of interest, no prejudice or hardship is
presented in this matter which would warrant the sanction of
disqualification.
IHC alleges in its Motion to Disqualify that the Howard
firm committed violations of Canons 4, 5 and 9.®

The court will

address each claim separately:

7

Counsel for the Howard firm argued that since Johnson withdrew
as counsel in the Wilson case in January, by the time the Motion
to Disqualify was filed in March its only representation was in
the Bodily case, and hence Wilson was a former client. It is
clear, however, that the operative facts occurred when the Howard
firm was representing Bodily against IHC and IHC against Wilson
simultaneously. The court regards this matter as a case of
simultaneous, not prior, representation. Counsel for the Howard
firm cites Beck v. Board of Regents, 568 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Kan.
1983) in support of its argument that Wilson should be regarded
as a former client since that is how it was regarded in a
somewhat similar situation in Beck, even though there had been
simultaneous representation prior to the hearing on the motion
for disqualification in that case. One major distinction as
between that case and this case, however, is that in Beck the
court found no violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility because of the simultaneous representation of
"possibly or potentially adverse clients." The focus of the
analysis in Beck was successive representation under Canon 4, but
the court found no violation of Canon 5 "under the facts of this
case." We have the reverse situation here.
e

While violations of other Canons of ethics were also asserted,
including Canons 1 and 2, no evidence or substantial argument was
urged at the hearing regarding those Canons. It is apparent that
claimed violations of Canons 4, 5 and 9 are relied upon
fundamentally as the basis for disqualification.

<S

A.

CANON 4
Canon 4 relates to situations in which an attorney

represents an interest adverse to a client he has previously
represented.

In such situations, the applicable ethical rule

provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly "use a confidence or
secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third
person, unless the client consents after a full disclosure.119
This ethical canon imposes a presumption of disclosure of the
confidences and secrets of a client and hence violation of the
Canon where the matters at issue are comparatively similar and
related.

In determining that matter, courts have generally

applied a "substantial relationship" test.

Under that standard,

an examination is undertaken of the nature, relationship,
similarities and other relevant aspects of an attorney's prior
Both the Tenth Circuit10 and the

and subsequent representation.
9 DR 4-101(B)(3).
10

In Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985),
(emphasis added) the Tenth Circuit observed:
The merits of this disqualification motion depend
on whether a substantial relationship exists between
the pending suit and the matter in which the
challenged attorney previously represented the client.
"Substantiality is present if the factual contexts of
the two representations are similar or
related."
•

•

*

Once a substantial relationship has been found, a
presumption arises that a client has indeed revealed
facts to the attorney that require his
disqualification. The majority of circuits that have
considered the issue have held this presumption to be
irrebuttable. We agree. The presumption is intended
to protect client confidentiality as well as to avoid

ifi

Utah Supreme Court11 have recognized the substantial relationship
test under Canon 4 as applicable to cases of subsequent adverse
representation of a former client.
This court considers the claimed applicability of Canon
4 to the situation presented at bar to be misplaced in that the
instant case does not present the situation of "subsequent
representation of a former client;" rather, this case involves
"simultaneous representation of two existing clients/1

Likewise,

the defense that no "substantial relationship" exists between the
Wilson wrongful discharge suit and the Bodily malpractice action
is similarly misplaced.

In addressing a situation involving

adverse representation of existing clients, the Tenth Circuit
Court, noted:
The propriety of [an attorney's] conduct is
"measured not so much against the similarities
in litigation, as against the duty of
undivided loyalty which an attorney owes to
each of his clients."

any appearance of impropriety.
See also In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659
F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir. 1981).
11

The Utah Supreme Court, in Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d
1195, 1202 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added) said:
Canon 4fs prohibitions against disclosure of client
confidences and secrets have generally been
interpreted to forbid an attorney from representing a
client against a former client in a matter
substantially related to the former client1s
representation.
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E.E.O.C., 749 F.2d at 622 (quoting Cinerama 5, Ltd. v. Cineramaf
Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The

Substantial

relationship1 test is . . • customarily applied in determining
whether a lawyer may accept employment against a former client")
(emphasis added).
This court considers that the conduct of the Howard
firm should be measured not so much in terms of similarities or
dissimilarities between the Wilson and Bodily cases, but by the
Howard firm's professional duty of undivided loyalty to its
clients.

Accordingly, the court will focus its attention upon

alleged violation of Canon 5 rather than the substantial
relationship test of Canon 4.1^
B.

CANON 5
1.

General Rule

Canon 5 and the disciplinary rules promulgated
thereunder require an attorney to exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of his client and to
decline proffered employment if the exercise
of his independent professional judgment in
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of the
proffered employment. . . .

^ if the substantial relationship analysis of Canon 4 wei*
applicable in this case, it would appear that the labor d i ^ n presented in the wrongful discharge case of Wilson would not rsubstantially related to the medical malpractice litigation .tu
this action. However, it is clear that the Canon 4 test is not
applicable here because at the time the Howard firm undertook
representation of IHC against Wilson the firm already represented
Bodily against IHC.

K

DR 5-105(A)•

Where an attorney represents two adverse clients

simultaneously, as the Howard firm has admittedly done in this
case, Canon 5 is clearly applicable and there is a per se
violation of the Canon, absent the application of exceptions
provided for in the Canon.

Further, it becomes the burden of

proof of the attorney who undertakes to represent adverse clients
simultaneously to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that there was no violation.13
2.

Exception

DR 5-105(c) makes clear that concurrent representation
of two adverse clients is permissible only under certain narrowly
prescribed circumstances:
[A] lawyer may represent multiple clients if
it is obvious that he can adequately represent
the interest of each and if each consents to
the representation after full disclosure of
the possible effect of such representation on
the exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of each. (Emphasis added.)
a.

(2>

Obviousness

The first requirement under DR 5-105(C) is that it
be "obvious" to an attorney, in his independent professional
judgment, that he would be able to represent both clients
adequately.

While the Code does not define the word "obvious,"

an objective standard should be applied, as noted in City
Consumer, 571 F. Supp. at 971 (quoting Unified Sewerage Agency,
646 F.2d 1339, 1348 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981)):
1

^ It is well-established that the burden of proving compliance
with the Code of Professional Responsibility is upon the party
undertaking adverse representation of two clients. City
Consumer, 571 F. Supp. at 570; Margulies, 696 P.2d at 1203.
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"[WJithout belaboring the point, we think
•obvious1 must refer to an objective standard
under which the ability of the attorney
adequately to represent each client is frea
from substantial doubt/1 I am persuaded that
the applicable objective standard, in this
case, for defining "obvious" is whether the
lawyer possesses substantial doubt that he can
adequately represent the interest of each
client.
Regarding the issue of obviousness, Johnson
admitted that he immediately detected an obvious conflict of
interest in taking on representation of IHC in the Wilson
litigation while suing IHC in Bodily and other malpractice
actions*

According to his testimony, Johnson told Rosenbloom at

the time of their initial telephone conversation, and he so
testified as to his present perception at the hearing, that
without the consent of IHC there could be no representation by
the Howard firm of IHC in the Wilson litigation.

The alleged

failure of California counsel to recognize or be concerned about
the conflict was and is irrelevant.

The point is that the

conflict should have been obvious to anyone in the Howard firm,
and in fact the conflict was obvious to Mr. Johnson, absent
informed client consent.

Accordingly, the court focuses on the

matter of consent.
b.

Informed Consent
The second requirement of DR 5-105(C) is that the

attorney obtain "consent" to the dual representation after "full
disclosure" of the possible effects of such representation.
Supreme Court of Utah has ruled, and we agree, that:
For client consent to be adequate in a
conflict of interest situation, the attorney
must not only inform both parties that he is

The

undertaking to represent them, but must also
explain the nature and implications of the
conflict in enough detail so that the parties
can understand why independent counsel may be
desirable.
Maroulies, 696 P.2d at 1203-04; see also City Consumer 571 F.
Supp. at 971 (informed consent required).
Counsel for the Howard firm argued that Johnson
reasonably could imply that he had obtained the requisite
•'consent1' because Johnson, in good faith, "fully disclosed" the
Howard firm's prior existing relationship with IHC to Rosenbloom,
the legal representative and agent of IHC, and there was never
any suggestion of a problem or conflict.14

There is no dispute
BJ^L

that Johnson at no time personally contacted any of IHC's

personnel, management or local counsel about a possible conflict;y^Further, no attorney from the Howard firm spoke with Mr. Bodily ZtT
or any of the other plaintiffs in the Howard firm s other pending
litigation against IHC about the potential conflict of interest
14

Johnson testified that he believed and expected that
Rosenbloom would advise the client and discuss the matter fully
with his superiors as a precondition to mailing the file or
requesting any work to be commenced by Johnson. It is urged on
behalf of the Howard firm that the nature of its involvement was
of very limited scope and that the so-called "rowing oar" was to
be manned almost entirely by California counsel. The following
factors were urged as bearing upon Johnson's stated belief that
the required consent had been obtained or that he didn't need to
pursue the matter: the limited scope of Johnson's intended
representation; Johnson's involvement in procedural as opposed to
substantive aspects of the litigation; the California firm's
direct employment of the local counsel; Johnson's services and
transmission of billing reports directly to the designated
California counsel; Johnson's reliance upon California counsel's
alleged representations concerning disclosure to and consent of
the client; the motives of the California and local counsel with
regard to their respective involvement; and the lack of actual
disclosures made to Johnson.
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before the Wilson case was taken on.

No memorandum or letter was

drafted by Johnson to Rosenbloom confirming the legal
representation arrangement and clarifying the delicate issue of
IHCfs consent to the Howard firm's proposed dual representation.
According to his own testimony, Johnson solely relied upon
representations of an out-of-state attorney, whom he had never
met nor dealt with before.
Even under the most favorable light of the facts
as related by Mr. Johnson, he failed to obtain the requisite
"consent after full disclosure" as mandated by Canon 5. Mr.
Johnson's conduct constituted blind faith reliance upon another
and was well below the minimum standards prescribed by the
applicable Canon of ethics.

Even absent Johnson's knowledge and

experience in this sensitive area of the law,15 his efforts and
conduct in obtaining the requisite consent were hardly adequate.
Under ethical standards applicable to all attorneys, there was
neither full nor reasonable disclosure in this case as to either
of the clients involved.
» »

While reliance on a fellow attorney's

I.,,

representations may often result in the complete disclosure
desired and in the receipt of necessary client consent, an
attorney so relying does so at his own peril.

Here Mr. Johnson's

15

Johnson is an experienced litigator, with particular
experience with the Code of Ethics, having vigorously moved for
disqualifications prior to this action on several occasions. It
would have been or should have been obvious to any attorney that
suing an entity in far reaching litigation might and probably
would be inconsistent with representing that entity even as to
substantially different matters. The necessity of obtaining
informed consent from both clients likewise should have been
obvious to any practicing attorney. A fortiori as to Mr.
Johnson.
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reliance on Rosenbloom was misplaced and unreasonable under the
circumstances.

It is not contested that Johnsonfs conduct is

imputable to the Howard firm.
This court finds that the Howard firm failed to
prove by a .preponderance of the evidence that there was no
violation of the ethical standards imposed by Canon 5 of the Code
of Professional Responsibilty.

Regardless of the question of

burden of proof, however, and even under the version of facts
most favorable to the Howard firm, it is manifest that Canon 5 of
the Code was violated*
C.

t^±

CANON 9
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides that MA lawyer should avoid even the appearance of
professional impropriety."

This Canon appears to be so all

inclusive and indefinite as to constitute a non-standard, but in
certain cases courts have found violations of this Cancn.16
1

This

^ The Supreme Court of Utah in Margulies, stated:
The basis of this tenet is that society's perception
of the integrity of our legal system may be as
important as the reality, since it is the perception
that engenders public confidence that justice will be
dispensed. Litigants are highly unlikely to be able
to maintain this confidence if their attorney in one
matter is allowed simultaneously to sue them in
another.

696 P.2d at 1204. The court pointed out that two important
policy considerations must always be balanced carefully by any
court ruling on a Motion to disqualify in this situation: the
undesirability of separating litigants from the counsel of their
choice and the public's perception of attorneys and the courts as
possessing the integrity necessary for the disposition of
justice. See Margulies, 696 P.2d at 1204. Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Utah said In re Hansen. 586 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah
1976) (emphasis added):

9.9

standard is difficult to apply because it requires the court to
speculate as to who the observers of relevant appearances are,
and it is vague. 17

One court determined that the standard is

"too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order,
except in the rarest of cases."18
because it constitutes an

f,

Another court rejected it

eye of the beholder" test.19

Like

pornography, however, the courts and other lawyers "know it when
they see it."

There may be substance to it in a proper case, but

the combination of doubt as to the viability of the standard,
plus lack of egregiousness under the facts of this case, leads
this court to stop short of finding a violation of Canon 9.

The practice of law is a profession whose members are
granted a special privilege of holding themselves out
as having the education, the skills and the integrity
to give help and guidance to others in their affairs.
• . . This includes that the attorney will become
unreservedly identified with his client's interests
and protect his rights. It means not only in dealing
with the client's adversary, but also that the
attorney will adhere to the ideals of honesty and
fidelity with the client himself; and that he will not
use his position to take any unfair advantage of the
special confidence which the client is entitled to
repose in him.
17

These matters are discussed and authorities collected in C.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 7.1.4 (1986).
18

Board of Education v. Nyguist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir.
1979).
19

Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir,
1977), cert, denied 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
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III.

SANCTION OF DISQUALIFICATION
The Tenth Circuit has long-recognized that "the control

of attorneys1 conduct in trial litigation is within the
supervisory powers of the trial judge, and his performance in
this area is a matter of judicial discretion."

Redd v. Shell Oil

Co.. 518 F.2d 311, 314 (10th Cir. 1975); Waters v. Western Co. of
North America, 436 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th Cir. 1971)).

In City

Consumer the court stated:
To disqualify a partyfs chos-en attorney is a
serious matter. "Where an attorneyfs conflict
of interest undermines the court's confidence
in the vigor of his representation of the
client, the court may disqualify the
attorney.11
571 F.2d at 970 (citations omitted).

Regarding a district

court's broad discretion, the Tenth Circuit has ruled that a
court's disposition of a disqualification motion will be reversed
"only if the court has abused its discretion."

E.E.O.C., 749

F.2d at 621.
The Second Circuit has identified two circumstances in
which disqualification will be ordered:
(1) where an attorney's conflict of interests
in violation of Canons 5 and 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility undermines the
court's confidence in the vigor of the
attorney's representation of his client, . . .
or more commonly (2) where the attorney is at
least potentially in a position to use
privileged information concerning the other
side through prior representation, for
example, in violation of Canons 4 and 9, thus
giving his present client an unfair advantage.

iM%>

Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444 (2d Cir. 1980); (quoting
Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1246).

Under the

Second Circuit view, the fact that the conduct in question has
been found to constitute a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility does not require disqualification of counsel as a
matter of course.

In Matter of Bohack Corp., 607 F.2d 258, 263

(2d Cir. 1979), it was noted that
courts have indicated great reluctance to
"separate a client from his chosen attorney
where the alleged misconduct does not
prejudice an opposing party and taint the
litigation in which he is appearing."
More recently, in Bottaro v. Hatton Assoc, 680 F.2d 895, 896-97
(2d Cir. 1982), the court adopted "a restrained approach,11
which calls for disqualification only upon a
finding that the presence of a particular
counsel will taint the trial by affecting his
or her presentation of a case. Board of
Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d
Cir. 1979); McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 444-446. We
have conceded that this test will not "correct
all possible ethical conflicts," McAlpin, 625
F.2d at 445, but have also noted that this
laudable goal cannot be attained through
rulings in the course of litigation without
inviting the wholesale filing of motions for
tactical reasons. The result would be
needless disruption and delay of litigation,
thereby impairing the efficient administration
of justice. See id. at 438, 446. Where a
threat of tainting the trial does not exist,
therefore, the litigation should proceed, the
remedy for unethical conduct lying in the
disciplinary machinery of the state and
federal bar. Id.
The sanction of disqualification of counsel in
litigation situations should be measured by the facts of each
particular case as they bear upon the impact of counsel's conduct
upon the trial.

The egregiousness of the violation, the presence
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or absence of prejudice to the other side, 20 and whether and to
what extent there has been a diminution of effectiveness of
counsel are important considerations.

In addition, equitable

considerations such as the hardship to the other side and the
stage of trial proceedings are relevant.

The essential issue to

be determined in the context of litigation is whether the alleged
misconduct taints the lawsuit*

For instance, in Beck v. Board of

Regents of State of Kan,, 568 F. Supp. 1107 (D.C. Kan. 1963) the
court withheld its "inherent power" to disqualify stating that:
The court should not act unless "the offending
attorney's conduct threatens to 'taint the
underlying trial1 with a serious ethical
violation." Field v. Freedman, 527 F. Supp.
935, 940 (D. Kan. 1981). Whether or not the
underlying trial may become tainted must be
addressed in each case based on its own
specific facts.
Id. at 1110.

See also Meat Price Investigators Assoc, v. Iowa

Beef Processors, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1977), aff'd,
572 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1978).
In the case at bar, the conduct of the Howard firm does
not so undermine the court's confidence in the firm's vigor and
ability to fairly represent Bodily as to warrant
disqualification.

This case does not present a situation of one

client gaining an unfair advantage over another by means of an
attorney's unethical wrongdoing.

The small amount of time spen

*° Improper communications and disobeyed court rules were found
as sufficient cause for disqualification of counsel in Kleiner v.
First Nat'l Bank, 102 F.R.D. 754 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd in part
rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985) (reversed for lack
of due process hearing on disqualification). But cf. Ceramco,
Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975), wherein
the court held that an attorney need not be disqualified where
the imDrooer communication does not Dreiudice the other oartv.
Oh>

and the very modest fee charged demonstrate that there was
certainly no incentive for great reward on the part of counsel•
In this case# there was no attempted or actual solicitation or
receipt by the Howard firm of any confidential information of any
kind.

Although not sufficient to excuse the attorney's personal

duty under Canon 5 to obtain informed consent after full
disclosure, the fact that Johnson dealt with and relied upon a
co-attorney rather than a lay person is significant as a
mitigating factor.21

There has been absolutely no prejudice to

IHC in this case, and there would be no prejudice to the ultimate
disposition of this case on the merits should the Howard firm be
permitted to continue its representation of Bodily.

Moreover,

disqualification of the Howard firm at this juncture would
substantially delay these proceedings and doubtless would work an
undue hardship not only on the plaintiff Bodily, but upon
plaintiffs in the other cases pending.
After weighing all of the facts and circumstances of
this case, this court concludes that disqualification is not
merited in this instance.
This Memorandum Decision and Order is in all respects
final and counsel need neither prepare nor submit additional
memoranda or orders for the court's consideration.
^1 In Margulies, the court emphasized that the law firm's
"reliance on a lay person" to pass on crucial conflict of
interest information without requiring "adequate assurances that
he had done so properly11 was "simply not sufficient to meet the
standard of professional conduct." While not a controlling
distinction in this case, Johnson's reliance upon a co-attorney
similarly to convey such critical information does mitigate in
favor of the Howard firm. 696 P.2d at 1203-04.
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[If 63,311] Frank L. Hawkins, in behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. Holiday Inns, Inc.
U. S. District Court, Western District of Tennessee, Western Division. No. C-72-217.
Filed March 6, 1980.
Sherman Act
Private Suits—Pretrial Procedures—Disqualification of Attorneys—Effect of Prior
Decision—Bar on Communication.—The doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar a court
from disqualifying a law firm from representing members of an antitrust class action.
An assertedly conflicting, prior adjudication of the issue by another court could not
preclude an independent, subsequent determination of the issue. Moreover, the firm
was properly barred from communicating with any of the class members in view of a
finding of impropriety on the part of the firm. A contention that the bar violated the
firm's constitutional rights was rejected. Seefl9190.18.
Denying new trial of 1980-1 Trade Casesff63,150.
Order Denying Motion for New Trial
MCRAE, D. J.: In this complex class antitrust litigation Holiday Inns, Inc. moved to
disqualify the law firm of Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler and the members
thereof from —«--»• ^»..*:-^r «ome o* fV»<* clar*
members in this case. After extensive hearings, this Court, on December 7, 1979,
granted the disqualification motion and
ordered prohibitions against communication
between the law firm and the class members
whom they claim to represent [1980-1 TRADE
CASES J 63,150].

Kaye, Scholer has filed a Motion for a
New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 FRCP,
which seeks as its primary relief granting
a new trial and denying the disqualification
motion of Holiday Inns, Inc. In the alternative the motion seeks to have the non-communication paragraph of the Court's order
deleted.
The bases advanced by Kaye, Scholer for
this motion are (1) that this Court is collaterally estopped from disqualifying Kaye,
Scholer because of the ruling of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana which on October 29,
1979, refused to disqualify the firm from
representing the plaintiffs in Domed Stadium
Hotel v. Holiday Inns, Inc., Number C-784115 [1979-2 TRADE CASES fl 62,993], and (2)

that the paragraph of this Court's order
prohibiting communication between Kaye,
Scholer and its clients impermissibly interferes with the right of freedom of speech of
Kaye, Scholer, particularly its members, Mr.
Handler and Ms. Head.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not
deprive this Court of the power to determine the disqualification motion.
Kaye, Scholer asserts that the decision in
Domed Stadium v. Holiday Inns, Inc., supra,
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denying a motion (made by Holiday Inns)
to disqualify them precludes this Court from
granting the disqualification motion in the
present case. Kaye, Scholer relies upon the
Supreme Court's application of offensive
collateral estoppel in Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979). *? AO point
in that opinion does the Court address the
application of collateral estoppel to a court
No authority has been cited, nor has this
Court discovered any authority which would
apply collateral estoppel against a court so
as to preclude the court from determining
a matter before it. This Court must reject
the idea that it is bound by a determination
of a District Court in another jurisdiction in
a case that is only obliquely related to the
case before this Court.
The Supreme Court in Parklane discusses
the policy and rationale underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The first consideration is whether a party who has had
issues of fact determined adversely to it in
an equitable proceeding may relitigate the
same issues before a jury. This consideration has no application to the present
controversy. The second factor is the promotion of judicial economy. There is no
saving in judicial time or effort in this case
because the matter has been heard and determined. A third consideration is the protection of litigants from the burden of
relitigating an identical issue with the same
party or his privy. This consideration also
is not found in the present case. The Supreme Court posed the "broader question
. . . whether it is . . . tenable to afford
a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same
issue." Parklane, supra at 328. In the circumstances of a motion to disqualify counsel, the broader question has a different
significance; i. e., regulation of the conduct of the attorneys in the particular
© 1980, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc.

case before the C o u r t See First
Wisconsin Mortgage Co. v. First Wisconsin
Corp.,
584 F. 2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978). This
Court has the power and the duty to regulate the conduct of members of its bar.
IBM v. Levin [1978-1 TRADE CASES 1162,114],
579 F. 2d 271, 283 (3rd Cir. 1978). This
Court has the obligation to preserve public
confidence in the propriety of the conduct
of those associated with the administration
of justice. Id. In the present case this Court
has found that Kaye, Scholer violated both
Canons 4 and 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. There was a finding not
only of an appearance of impropriety, but
actual improper conduct on the part of
Kaye, Scholer. Under these circumstances,
not only is the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable; this Court would be remiss
in failing t o disqualify Kaye, Scholer.
Further, it is a matter of mere fortuity
that the issuance of the ruling on the motion ii Domed Stadium ^receded ...^ . «li.» b
of this Court 1 It should be noted that the
Hawkins case has been pending since 1972,
long before the Domed Stadium case was
filed. Kaye, Scholer knew of the Hawkins
case, and was aware of the pendency of the
disqualification motion in it at the time the
disqualification motion w a s filed in Domed
Stadium. Under these circumstances, had
Kaye, Scholer thought the doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable, it should have
moved for a stay of the proceedings on the
motion in Domed Stadium. This would have
had the effect of relieving Kay, Scholer of
the burden of litigating this issue twice.
Kaye, Scholer, however, did not choose to
do this. Instead, it chose to take two bites
at the apple, and did not raise collateral
estoppel until its Motion, for N e w Trial in
this cause. If Kaye, Scholer had chosen
to assert its collateral estoppel theory at
at the time it delivered a copy of the Domed
Stadium ruling to this Court, Holiday Inns
would have had an opportunity to appeal
the Domed Stadium, ruling.* It would be
manifestly unfair to apply collateral estop-
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pel against Holiday Inns now. See Berner
v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, 346
F. 2d 532, 540 (2nd Cir. 1965) cert, denied
382 U . S . 983 (1966).
The order prohibiting communication between
Kaye, Scholer and any of the plaintiffs
in this cause is warranted by the
finding of impropriety on the
part of Kaye, Scholer
Kaye, Scholer asserts that the order of
this Court prohibiting" communication between it and some of the class members as
their alleged clients, impermissibly interferes with their freedom of speech. At this
juncture the Court notes that the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies to Kaye,
Scholer. There are certain demands made
upon attorneys which may in fact interfere
with unfettered speech, such as the duty t o
preserve a client's confidences.
In IBM v. Levin, supra at 281, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the finding of the District Court that the disqualified law firm
"never acquired any confidential information. . . ." Because of that finding, the order
to turn over work product to the successor
lawyers could not prejudice the party seeking the disqualification. That situation is
not present here, as this Court specifically
found that Kaye, Scholer inquired into
broad phases of the operations of Holiday
Inns, Inc., thus acquiring confidential
information.
In its reply memorandum filed January 8,
1980, Kaye, Scholer for the first time requests a stay of the non-communication
order pending appeal as an alternative to its
original alternative ground for relief in the
Motion for N e w Trial, a modification which
would allow it to discuss with its clients
the desirability of taking an appeal from
the ruling of this Court. Initially, this
Court questions the need of Kaye, Scholer
to discuss an appeal of this ruling with its
alleged clients.* Kaye, Scholer is the disqualified party, not the clients. Also, this

1
The motion in Hawkins was filed on August International Association of Holiday Inns. This
Association is composed of all Holiday Inn
18, 1978. The Domed Stadium case was not
franchise holders and the franchisor. Kaye,
filed until December of 1978.
* It is possible to appeal an order of dis- Scholer now claims to represent a portion of
the class members who did not opt out. These
qualification In the Sixth Circuit. General
are called the non-Hawkins class members.
Electric Co. v. The Valeron Corp., 608 F. 2d
265 (6th Cir. 1979). An order denying dis- Their interests in this case are not the same
in this lawsuit as the Interest of the officers
qualification, however, is not appealable in the
of the Association. Furthermore, as this Court
Sixth Circuit, although the Court understands
noted in its ruling, the non-Hawkins class
the law of the Fifth Circuit is to the contrary.
members are ably represented by attorneys in
See Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co.
[1979-1 TRADE CASES U 62,433], 592 F. 2d 290 the Arm of Heiskeil, Donelson, Adams, Williams
& Kirsch of Memphis, Tennessee, which attor(6th Cir. 1979) and cases cited therein.
neys are the attorneys of record for the non* As the disqualification ruling indicates, Kaye,
Hawkins class members.
Scholer actually considers its client to be the

Trade Regulation Reports
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Court has found violations of Canons 4 and
9. The actual impropriety of Kaye, Scholer's
conduct mandates that a stay of this ruling
not be granted. It is the opinion of this
Court that the restraint imposed on Kaye,
Scholer by this Court's previous order is
necessary to effectuate the disqualification
order, and that such restraint can have no
effect on Kaye, Scholer's ability to appeal
this ruling. Furthermore, a stay will fur-
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ther delay the pursuit of the lawsuit by the
plaintiff, Hawkins, and the class members
he represents.
It is the decision of this Court that the
previous ruling is correct on the facts and
the law, and that the motion for a new
trial is without merit and is denied in its
entirety.
It is so ordered.

[fl 63,312] Equifax, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.
U. S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. No. 78-3089. Filed April 30, 1980. Petition to
Review a Decision of the Federal Trade Commission.
Clayton and FTC Acts
Acquisitions—Relevant Product Market—Credit Reports and Mortgage Reports—
Cross-Elasticity of Supply.—Mortgage reports and credit reports were not shown to be in
the same product market for purposes of assessing the competitive effects of an acquisition
under Sec 7 of the Clayton Act or Sec. 5 of the FTC Act. Although cross-elasticity of
supply ca.. L- .. .did basis fur pK**«ig two commodities in the same market, it did not
appear that production of such reports involved similar techniques or technology or that
producers of such reports had produced both types. See fl 4290.68.
Vacating and remanding FTC cease and desist order, Dkt. 8920.
For petitioner: J. Wallace Adair, Francis A. O'Brien, and Albert O. Cornelison, of
Howrey & Simon, Washington, D. C, Kent E. Mast, Atlanta, Ga. For respondent:
Mark W. Haase, Washington, D. C.
Before: COWEN,* Senior Judge, TRASK and Hue, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
TRASK, Cir. J.: Equifax appeals from a
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) order
finding that Equifax violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C §18/ by
acquiring three credit bureaus in 1970 and
1971, thereby lessening competition in the
"local credit reporting" service market.
The complaint in this action charged the
Retail Credit Company, now known as
Equifax, Inc. (Equifax), with violating section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. § 18)
and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U. S. C. §45),* by reason
of its acquisitions of Credit Bureaus Inc.,
Salem, Oregon (CB West Coast) in January 1970, of the Credit Bureau, Inc., Wash• Honorable Wilson Cowen, Senior Judge,
United States Court of Claims, sitting by designation.
1
15 U. S. C. § 18 provides In pertinent part:
"No corporation engaged In commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital and no
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also In commerce, where In
4
any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be
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ington, D. C. (CBDC) in October 1970, and
of the credit reporting assets of the Retail
Credit Association of Portland, Oregon, Inc.
(CB Portland) in January 1971. The complaint charged that these acquisitions would
have the probable effect of substantially lessening competition in the "credit reporting"
product market, and various product submarkets both in the United States as a
whole and in several sections of the country,
including Washington, D. C ; the San Francisco Bay Area; Portland, Oregon; Tacoma,
Washington; and other metropolitan areas
in the Pacific Northwest. We must affirm
the FTC's findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence. 15 U. S. C. § 45(c);
Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC [1978-1 TRADE
CASES fl 62,087], 577 F. 2d 1368, 1378

(9th

substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly/'
* 15 U. S. C. 5 45 provides In pertinent part:
"(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to
prohibit. (1) Unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful. * • •
"(6) The Commission Is hereby empowered
and directed to prevent persons, partnerships,
or corporations . . . from using unfair methods,
of competition in or affecting commerce.''
© 1980, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.

